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Abstract: This paper considers the plight of Western education and the demands it makes upon us. It 
argues that the feared end of education underpins and unduly shackles reflection on the current crisis of 
education. As a spectral, abysmal prospect, it both fetters and stimulates educational critique, mobilising 
critique to the support of a cause it cannot question because it is committed to its rescue. In a time of crisis, 
we find ourselves tied only more firmly to education, forced to express or enact our faith in educational 
redemption. Drawing from the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, a contrasting, 
genealogical critique of education is advanced, one that might defer the impulse of educational redemption 
and defy the limits on thought currently imposed. A genealogy of education is outlined that strips education 
of its dignity, and thereby challenges its dominion. The necessary incoherence of such an approach is 
explored.  
 
Blaming and Desiring Education 
 
Forever reaching beyond itself, education promises what it cannot deliver whilst delivering what it 
would never openly promise (Allen, 2017a; Clarke, 2018). Given this level of deception, the end of 
education might be welcomed as much as it is feared. But the end of education is just as 
duplicitous. Like the associated notion of ´an educated public,µ education ´is a ghost that cannot 
be excisedµ (MacIntyre, 1987, p. 34). In short, only those who are already conditioned by the idea 
of education, those with a taste for such falseness, can fear its end. The end of education is a 
product, an extension, of education itself. 
The end of education haunts the educated with threats against truth, the future of liberal 
polities, if not civilization itself. Admittedly, few would frame a defence of education in these terms. 
Few would couch the defence of this or that school or university, educational practice or principle, 
in such frenzied, grandiose language. Only occasionally do these fears break through in gestures of 
sentimental attachment, approaching hysteria. For example, at the end of an otherwise sober lecture 
on the history and contemporary plight of the university, Wendy Brown (LSE Podcasts, 2014) 
suggests that the current crisis in education is so deep-set that it is ´impoverishing the future of 
civilisationsµ Those professors who would still defend the old educational values find themselves 
in a position, Brown argues, akin to the ´structurally weak but potentially symbolically potent 
SRVLWLRQ RI 7LDQDQPHQ·V WDQN PDQ 7XQLVLD·V IUXLW VHOOHU 3DOHVWLQH·V 5DFKHO &RUULH « going up 
against the regime as we fight for a cause, a cause of research and teaching that bears on the future 
of human and cultural enrichment, planetary sustainability, democracy, other such values.µ1  
                                                          
1 I am indebted to Matthew Charles for drawing my attention to this lecture and episode within it. Though 
the tank metaphor was subsequently picked up and approvingly used in the question and answer session, it 
should be noted that fellow panellist Michael Power did object to the rhetoric: ´/HW·VEHDELWFDUHIXODERXW
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For an older but more sustained example of this educational fear, it is worth turning to Neil 
3RVWPDQ·V ERRN The End of Education (1995). In that book, Postman gives his own portentous 
account of the crisis in education, claiming that the educational project of modernity is in a terminal 
condition. At first sight, Postman simply rolls out the old (and deeply problematic2) truism that 
there is a crisis of value in education following which only renewed commitment to educational 
LGHDOVZLOOVDYHHGXFDWLRQDQGVRWRRRXUVHOYHVIURPREOLYLRQ%XW3RVWPDQ·VSROHPLFJRHVIXUWKHU
revealing the implicit threat that underpins the argument for education as he suggests that faith in 
education-as-enlightenment (the idea that universalised education leads to a more civilized, humane 
existence) has worn so thin and lost so much vigour that urgent action of a more radical sort is 
required if it is to be revived. This leads The End of Education to its polemic conclusion. It must 
frighten its audience with the prospect of disappearance as a way of forcing a very particular kind of 
defence. Fear for education must operate as the basis, or prompt, upon which the salvation of 
education is to be built. It seems as though Postman would have us cleave from desperation to the 
neglected ends of education, where ´endµ has now become a synonym for ´purposeµ  
3RVWPDQ·VDSSHDORQEHKDOIRIHGXFDWLRQPLJKWVHHPRXWRIFKDUDFWHUIRUDQDXWKRURIWKH
polemic Teaching as a Subversive Activity. That book was designed, so it tells us, to help students 
GHYHORS´EXLOW-LQ VKRFNSURRIFUDSGHWHFWRUVµ WKDWZRXOGDOORZ WKHPWR VXUYLYH WKHDIIOLFWLRQVRI
mass media, subvert outdated cultural norms, and escape the sclerotic effects of traditional 
schooling (Postman & :HLQJDUWQHU  S  %XW 3RVWPDQ·V DUJXPHQW IRU HGXFDWLRQ
both there and in The End of Education, is characteristic of a pedagogue whose critique is the 
outgrowth of disappointment; whose outlook, borrowing from his earlier work, is the product of 
´VLPSOH URPDQWLFPHQµDVKHDQG:HLQJDUWQHUSXW LWGHWHUPLQHGWREHOLHYHDJDLQVW WKHRGGV LQ
´WKH LPSURYDELOLW\ RI WKH KXPDQ FRQGLWLRQ WKURXJK HGXFDWLRQµ S  6XLWDEO\ UHIRUPHG WKH
school system remaLQVIRU3RVWPDQ´WKHRQO\VRFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQWKDWH[LVWVWRIXOILOWKLVIXQFWLRQµS
,WPXVWSURGXFHWKHNLQGRI´DFWLYHO\LQTXLULQJIOH[LEOHFUHDWLYHLQQRYDWLYHWROHUDQWOLEHUDO
SHUVRQDOLW\µ WKDW PRGHUQ FLYLOL]DWLRQ LV VDLG WR UHTXLUH S . The salvation of education is 
XQGHUVWRRG KHUH WR EH D PDWWHU RI HQVXULQJ WKH ´VXUYLYDOµ RI FLYLOL]DWLRQ QR OHVV SURWHFWLQJ LW
against the tendency of all systems to become rigid and unresponsive, to lose vitality and direction, 
WR´UXQGRZQµDQG´UHGXFH WRFKDRVDQGXVHOHVVQHVVµS 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the tanks metaphor. People in this room still have a pretty good life relative to people who actually stand in 
front of real tanksµ 
2 7KLVIDPLOLDUFDVHIRUHGXFDWLRQFDQEHREMHFWHGWRRQWZRFRXQWV)LUVWO\ WKHUHLV,DQ+XQWHU·VDUJXPHQW
(not much heeded by educational critics) that this call to shore up educational ideals is based on a 
misunderstanding of how the modern administrative state and its associated educational institutions were 
built: namely, that both depended for their success on the removal of absolute principles of moral perfection, 
humanity and justice from the sphere of government, allowing the educational bureaucrat to build education 
on a more restrained, orderly basis that was not overdetermined and undermined by a politics of conscience. 
Hence the disturbing realization amongst defenders of education and educational idealists that its institutions 
will grind on quite happily without them. In other words, education continues to operate despite the ´crisis of 
valueµ they bemoan (Hunter, VHHDOVRRXUVXPPDU\RI+XQWHU·VDUJXPHQWLQ$OOHQ & Goddard, 2017, 
pp. 155²158, 169²171). Secondly, the perceived crisis of educational value is, today, rather oddly, the means 
by which educational value is produced (Allen, 2017a). Education has long exhausted itself of something that 
might be described (very roughly) as its intrinsic value. It should be understood today by analogy to the 
commodity Marx describes in Capital, which, as I gloss, ´has little intrinsic worth beyond its immediate use-
valueµ achieving universal value ´only as a set of relations, established by those who act before thinking, by 
those who assume value exists and base their actions upon the common assumption of its objectivity. In a 
similar way, modern education is given its content though the ceaseless activity of educators who begin only 
with the deed, assuming that education has independent worth beyond the immediate instances of its useµ (p. 
156). This fragile relation produces the crisis that educators must perpetually solve, as they attempt to save 
education, and produce educational value, by exhausting themselves as a labour force. 
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As a renowned and popular cultural commentator, Postman constructs his argument by 
appealing to a common concern amongst educators and educational critics: the idea that true 
education, sometimes called ´realµ or ´authenticµ education, is either losing ground in late 
modernity to a range of anti-educational forces (as reported in Moore & Clarke, 2016), or 
submitting to its own deadening inertia. The catalogue of anti-educational forces includes the usual 
suspects: capital, instrumentalism and audit (or, for technology enthusiasts and educational 
entrepreneurs, the unfortunate persistence of out-dated and reactionary educational traditions). This 
catalogue is sometimes expanded to include all believed enemies of truth and civilized culture, 
ranging from the so-called dupes of post-truth politics to the threat of radicals and feared 
extremists. Nonetheless, and despite the (apparent) on-going debasement of education by foes such 
as listed above, those wishing to shore up the institutions of civil society, or better orient it to the 
demands of technological progress and social flux, still return unflinchingly to education, 
attempting to find hope and affordance in its decaying architectures.3 Education is at once blamed 
for its failures and invoked as a solution to an endless list of social, economic and political woes, 
having achieved the near ´messianic role of bearer of personal, national and global redemptionµ 
(Peim, 2012, p. 235). This formula, at once blaming education as the source of social ills and 
desiring the reform of education as a solution to those same ills, is commonplace, and symptomatic 
of our continued attachment to an educational project of some description.  
The pervasive and circular logic of this redemptive formula underpins reform efforts involving 
a complex mix of voluntary, faith, social enterprise, philanthropic and corporate interests (where 
WKH ODWWHU DWWDFN ´IDLOLQJµ HGXFDWLRQDO V\VWHPV WR MXVWLI\ WKHLU RZQ HGXFDWLRQDO DQG SURILW-making 
interventions; see Ball, Junemann & Santori, 2017; Ball & Junemann, 2011). It extends to the work 
of critical pedagogues and academic critics who believe that education can still operate as a 
collective good, establishing itself as the basis of new forms of democratic sociality. Even work that 
H[SOLFLWO\UHFRJQLVHVWKHH[WHQWRIWKHFULVLVIDFLQJWKH:HVWDFULVLVZKLFKLV´URRWHGLQWKHHURVLRQ
of a common moral value base « LQVLVWV RQ UHVSRQGLQJ HGXFDWLRQDOO\µ LQ WKLV FDVH E\ ´PDNLQJ
values common in and through educDWLRQµin a context where a pre-existing set of common values can no 
longer be assumed (Bergdahl & Langmann, 2017, emphasis in original). This circular redemptive 
formula is also repeated at a disciplinary level. In relation to the philosophy of education as an area 
of study, and in response to its on-going marginalisation, proponents can only offer the solution of 
more philosophy of education. Very few critics within the field are able to entertain the idea that less 
philosophy of education in its current form might be preferable (Carr, 2004). 
As I argue below, this tendency to make education culpable and then position education as a 
solution forecloses thought about education, basing such thought within an assumed good it cannot 
deny or properly question. Education endures as a belief system and retains its assumed dignity, 
                                                          
3 To indicate just how well entrenched this position might be, it is worth pointing out that even when the 
architectures of education are viewed as objectively hopeless³insofar as they appear unable to achieve their 
ideals³a role for education and its professional educators remains. It has been argued using the work of the 
existentialist philosopher Gabriel Marcel that education should be invested with an unflagging form of 
´absolute hopeµ that can never be disappointed (Zipory, 2017). Drawing from a very different Autonomist 
Marxist tradition, and arguing for a very different outcome, Richard Hall (2018) has suggested that the current 
Weltschmerz experienced by academics be intensified, by ´teaching hopelessnessµ (p. 109), as a starting point 
for ´re-imagining higher learning through mass intellectualityµ (p. 110)³a process that would reclaim and put 
to revolutionary use what remains socially useful in academic labour: ´This is our socially useful, pedagogic 
taskµ (p. 110). Finally, and again issuing from a very different political and philosophical point of view, Emile 
Bojesen (2018) has argued, drawing from Nietzsche, that educators should attempt an optimistic disposition 
´in spite of it allµ because education is inescapable, unavoidable³where this would be an optimism unlike 
any other since it issues from more or less complete disenchantment³and that this state of optimism would 
itself be educational. 
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despite its failure (from the perspective of capital) to open itself to the wisdom of the market and 
the affordances of technology, or despite (from the perspective of humanist critique) its daily 
reduction to technocratic procedure. Though it has become commonplace to argue in the latter 
case that there is too much that is WHFKQRFUDWLF SHUIRUPDWLYH DQG LQVWUXPHQWDO DERXW WRGD\·V
education, it could also be suggested (not a little deviously) that, just as there is perhaps still ´too 
much theology in politicsµ (Balibar, 2016, p. 13), there is still too much of the sacred in education.  
This paper will suggest that a genealogy of education³drawing from the work of Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Michel Foucault³might help desacralize it. Clearly, such a project lies beyond the 
scope of a single paper, even a single book. I only offer a gesture here towards what a genealogy of 
education might achieve. The idea of offering a gesture is nonetheless more than it seems, since the 
manner in which such a genealogy proceeds is as important as the arguments it mobilises. In this 
respect, the greatest failing of this paper³a necessary, unavoidable failing³is that it still makes too 
much sense to the educated.  
 
 
Framing the Problem 
 
At its most reductive, the logic of educational redemption operating today is as follows: Education 
(and educated being) can only be saved by the faithful commitments of educators and educated 
people (like Postman). If our educational institutions are to remain worthy of their mission of 
upholding ideals of enlightenment and justice, they must (so it is said) rescue themselves from 
cynicism, despair and performative self-interest. Educational critics may well resist this depiction of 
the educator as some kind of martyr to the faith, arguing perhaps that it exaggerates the extent to 
which responsibility for redeeming education is heaped onto the individual. Most educators and 
almost all critical academics would like to see themselves operating at a different level, defending 
education by maintaining educational structures, by building educational relationships and 
community attachments, and by understanding and justifying their work not in the language of 
belief, but in the languages of social justice, evidence and commitment to truth. But the feared 
destruction of education operates here too. It acts as a stimulus to educational critique and reform, 
which, in its anatomization of educational problems, only ever speaks for education. As such, 
arguments for the defence of education trick us into an enlistment we cannot escape. They 
stimulate modes of educational critique that are, despite all protestation, also acts of faith.  
This is perfectly understandable. A world without education is, intellectually speaking, 
unthinkable. As educated beings we cannot think the end of it. The end of education is not 
considered in its full, abysmal sense, because it is a stupefying prospect. It is hard to approach the 
end of education without becoming stupefied (struck senseless) when the condition of being 
educated defines our intellectual, social and moral being, when it conditions how we view the world 
DQGLQWHUDFWZLWKRQHDQRWKHU1HLO3RVWPDQ·VIDLOXUHWRJUDSSOHZLWKWKHSUREOHPKHDQQRXQFHVLV
hardly unusual. Despite its title, The End of Education is not really about the end of education at all, 
but the end of a particular disposition towards popular schooling, a potential disappearance which 
is easier to comprehend and yet by no means easy to envisage. Here, 3RVWPDQ·V DSSURDFK KLV
invocation of a prospect that is immediately deferred, is typical of every lament concerning the 
unfulfilled aims of the great formative endeavour of modern mass schooling, and every complaint 
at the changing function of a university that looks and operates every day more like a business. The 
feared destruction or end of education is widely felt, often implied, and sometimes invoked, but 
remains largely untouched as a problem. We will not approach it, but run from it, as we flee to the 
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school, university or educational moment we seek to defend. Some Gods fail, Postman argues, but 
we cannot allow the education God to fail. That prospect is always ruled out and denied from the 
outset.  
Despite such habitual foreclosure, there are still things that can be done to perturb education 
and open it to questioning. Even Postman hints at a way out, making reference to Friedrich 
1LHW]VFKH·V ´death of Godµ thesis, alluding to it in passing but without getting involved in any 
detail. This paper will attempt to find a way around the impasse that The End of Education highlights 
by asking what a more detailed confrontation with Nietzsche might look like. It asks if Nietzschean 
thought might help us to grapple with the problem Postman sets up but fails to confront.4  
For the purposes of this paper, I will not approach Nietzschean texts with exegetical intent, 
JLYHQ6WDWHQ·VSRLQWWKDWQRDXWKHQWLF1LHW]VFKHDQSRVLWLRQRUV\VWHPDWLFDUJXPHQWLVWREH
found in them. We encounter instead a plurality of voices that tell us ´with the greatest conviction 
and sense of authority the most contradictory thingsµ (p. 4). This does not mean that for Nietzsche 
DQ\WKLQJJRHV$FFRUGLQJWR6WDWHQWKHWH[WXDOG\QDPLFRI1LHW]VFKH·VZRUNVKRXOGEHXQGHUstood 
E\DSSUHFLDWLQJKLVWH[WVDVLQSDUW´GUHDPWH[WVµSRUWH[WVWKDWEHWUD\D´OLELGLQDOHFRQRP\µ
S  7KLV OLELGLQDO HFRQRP\ H[LVWV DORQJVLGH DQG LV PRGXODWHG WKURXJK WKH ´WH[WXUH RI WKH
SKLORVRSKLFDO WH[Wµ WKHSDUW WKDW W\SLFDOO\EHFRPHV WKe object of systematic commentary), where 
WKH ODWWHU GHILQHV LWV ´ORJLFDO HFRQRP\,µ FRQVWUDLQLQJ EXW QHYHU HQWLUHO\ RYHUULGLQJ WKH OLELGLQDO
economy via its textual laws, laws of logic and dialectic. It is within this battleground of competing 
forces that WKH WH[W LV FRQVWLWXWHG ZKHUH WKH ZRUN VLJQHG ´1LHW]VFKHµ SDVVHV WKURXJK YDULRXV
subject positions, pursuing thought to its extreme consequences, as he attempted to find out which 
lines of thought and personae drew him most strongly.  
To put this in slightly different terms, one might say that there is a derangement of conscious 
LQWHQWLRQDOLW\ LQ 1LHW]VFKH·V ZRUN DQ LQWUXVLRQ LQWR WKH WH[W RI WKH FRQWUDGLFWRU\ IRUFHV WKDW
constitute the subject. This is why his texts will always undermine systematic commentary, the type 
of commentary that would relate them to the relatively stable subject position of an originating 
thinker. In this regard, debating what Nietzsche actually made of education is less important, it 
seems to me, than extending the derangement of his writing to our faith in education. With this in 
mind, I draw in part from the work of Michel Foucault who alongside others (such as Pierre 
Klossowski, Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida) was prepared to engage with what some might 
FRQVLGHU1LHW]VFKH·s more fiendish insights. In particular, I focus on the vexed issue of genealogy 
as a (potentially devastating) mode of critique, where my reading of Foucault on Nietzsche, and 
Foucault in relation to Nietzschean genealogy, is guided by my interest in how Nietzsche might 
unsettle our attachment to education. There is no broader appraisal here RI )RXFDXOW·V ZRUN LQ
relation to Nietzsche, nor do ,GLVFXVVLQDQ\SDUWLFXODUGHWDLOKRZ)RXFDXOW·VUHDGLQJVRI1LHW]VFKH
have been received. I seek to indicate only a direction one might take, where Foucault helps us 
accompany Nietzsche to the brink of educated being, a place we naturally abhor and find 
unfathomable as educated subjects.  
 
 
                                                          
4 If nothing else, one might suggest that the considerable hostility to education (particularly modern 
HGXFDWLRQGLVSOD\HGLQ1LHW]VFKH·VZRUNPDNHVLWHDVLHUWRFRQVLGHULWVHQGDVVRPHWKLQJZHFRXOGDSSURDFK
with dark interest rather than plain horror. But, as I have explored elsewhere, this interpretation of 
Nietzschean thought and its relation to the question of education is not without controversy (Allen, 2017b). 
Previous scholarship agrees that Nietzsche leads us to question aspects of education, but does not take 
Nietzschean thought to its limit, as we wonder if modern education and its associated moral and intellectual 
devices, its Western ancestral traditions and biases, might be questionable as a whole. 
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Nietzsche, Foucault, Genealogy 
 
)RXFDXOW·VHVVD\´Nietzsche, Genealogy, Historyµ (1971/2000a) provides a point of entry to those 
who might attempt a genealogy of education. Part commentary on Nietzsche, part elaboration of 
his own philosophy, Foucault shows how a genealogy of the Nietzschean sort sets out to 
undermine everything we take for granted, making our commitments and everyday assumptions 
questionable, perhaps even untenable.  
Previous academic work has sought to distinguish between Nietzschean and Foucauldian 
genealogy. Some argue that there are ´deep continuitiesµ between the two (Saar, 2008, p. 312). Both 
Nietzsche and Foucault attempt to disturb the reader by interrogating the ambiguous and 
contradictory historical forces from which we have been constituted. And both supplement this 
kind of analytic, cognitive disturbance with rhetorical devices designed to further undermine the 
subjective attachments of their readers. Finally, both suggest that alternative, rival subjectivities and 
modes of self-formation are possible. Other commentators have claimed that, even if we admit 
these continuities, there is still considerable divergence between Nietzschean genealogy (as found, 
for example, in On the Genealogy of MoralsDQG)RXFDXOW·VRZQJHQHDORJLFDOZRUNVPRVW
notably Discipline and Punish, 1975/1991; see, for example, Gutting, 2005). A rough caricature of this 
commonly held position is that Nietzschean genealogy is more speculative, fanciful and 
freewheeling, whereas Foucauldian genealogy is patiently diligent, resolutely scholarly, analytically 
cool, and (one might hope) academically credible.5 )URP WKLV SHUVSHFWLYH )RXFDXOW·V HVVD\
´Nietzsche, Genealogy, Historyµ is potentially misleading, since it makes it difficult to disentangle 
the two thinkers. In his exposition of Nietzsche, Foucault does not explain where he diverges from 
Nietzschean thought. In a similar way, this essay is not driven by the idea that there are two distinct 
versions of genealogy that require dividing or separating out. It offers an exposition of Nietzschean 
genealogy that is necessarily disWRUWHGE\HQJDJHPHQWZLWK)RXFDXOW·VZRUN 
This kind of approach fits with the irreverent but nonetheless serious and attentive strategy of 
genealogical investigation. As Foucault declared, ´I am simply a Nietzscheanµ describing a position 
from which he would develop a number of ´anti-Nietzschean theses (which are nevertheless 
Nietzschean)µ S)RXFDXOW·VHQJDJHPHQWZLWK1LHW]VFKHZDVFRPSOH[DQGFDQQRW
be reduced to discussion of the relative (in)ILGHOLWLHV LQ )RXFDXOW·V XVH RI 1LHW]VFKH. Foucault 
appropriated Nietzsche, but in ways that were at the same time faithful to Nietzschean philosophy, 
as he saw it. This complex relationship has generated its own commentary (see, for example, Sluga, 
2005; Mahon, 1992; Lash, 1984). Without wishing to assimilate the two thinkers or reduce 
genealogy to a single principle, I would argue that both versions of genealogy (Foucauldian and 
Nietzschean) converge on the emphasis that guides my reading below: namely, the idea that 
genealogy works to undermine secure attachments. As Foucault put it, this mode of analysis ´is 
FDSDEOHRIGHFRPSRVLQJLWVHOIFDSDEOHRIVKDWWHULQJWKHXQLW\RIPDQ·VEHLQJWKURXJKZKLFKLWZDV
thought that he could extend his sovereignty to the events of the pastµ (1971/2000a, p. 379). For 
Foucault, as for Nietzsche, it can no longer be assumed that ´the nature of consciousness is always 
identical to itself.µ There is nothing, no single entity or point of view, that would provide the 
                                                          
5 As MacIntyre (1990) argues, this divergence in style and approach is also reflected in their life trajectories: 
´1LHW]VFKH·VSURJUHVVZDVIURPSURIHVVRUWRJHQHDORJLVWµ (p. 49)³where the latter made life in the academy 
untenable for Nietzsche³ZKHUHDV)RXFDXOW·VSURJUHVVZDVLQWKHRSSRVLWHGLUHFWLRQDQG´ended with nearly 
fifteen years speaking ex cathedra from the Collège de Franceµ (p. 53). ,Q0DF,QW\UH·V DVVHVVPHQW)RXFDXOW
was in part responsible for ´UHVWRULQJ 1LHW]VFKH·V SURMHFW WR WKH SURIHVVRULDWH IURP ZKLFK 1LHW]VFKH KDG
rescued itµ S7KRXJK0DF,QW\UH·VDVVHVVPHQWLVDOLWWOHWoo neat, there is undoubtedly some truth in the 
observation that with (or at least following) Foucault, genealogy ´regressed into academiaµ (p. 54).  
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connecting framework along which a continuous history of humankind could be built: ´Nothing in 
man³not even his body³is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for 
understanding other men.µ Genealogy ´reintroduces into the realm of becoming everything 
considered immortal in manµ (pp. 379²380). It is with this object in view that education³assumed 
to be foundational to civilized being³comes under genealogical interrogation.  
 
Reframing Genealogy 
 
Before submitting education to genealogical investigation, there are some inherited problems 
that need to be addressed. Since Foucault, genealogy has been adapted to become a recognised 
methodological approach in educational research and in the social sciences more generally (for 
examples, see Scheurich & McKenzie, 2005; Meadmore, Hatcher, & McWilliam, 2000; Tamboukou, 
1999). Arguably, the accumulated effect of its adoption has been to reduce the disturbance 
genealogy might otherwise cause as it is clarified, codified and blended with other philosophies and 
methods, as it is made amenable to the exigencies of research endeavour. What I envisage here is a 
departure from that tradition, taking genealogical analysis beyond a point most academics will 
countenance.  
Following Foucault, and heavily influenced by a loose group of researchers associated with the 
journal Economy and Society (including but not limited to the work of Nikolas Rose, Thomas Osborne 
and Peter Miller), genealogy has been enacted as a mode of critique that attends to the mundane, 
sensitising us to historical phenomena we might otherwise overlook. Such interpreters correctly 
identify the ´anti-Platonicµ aspects of genealogical work, which positions itself against the pursuit 
of truth as an abstract objective, investigating instead the conditions that produce truth effects. 
They draw attention to the localised nature of genealogy as it pays attention to the particular. At 
their most political, these researchers tend to identify with the idea that genealogical work allows for 
some kind of insurrection of knowledge, where historically marginalised practices, discourses and 
voices are to be uncovered through the deployment of critique that disturbs dominant narratives 
DQG DVVXPSWLRQV 7KHVH DQDO\WLF WUHQGV ZKLFK RZH PRUH WR D UHFHLYHG YLHZ RI )RXFDXOW·V
significance than they do to Nietzsche, have the effect of segmenting and perhaps isolating enquiry, 
as they reduce larger issues to their local contexts where they can be approached in a piecemeal 
fashion. The analyst tends to leave the actual labour of insurrection to those who have been 
´assistedµ by the attention given them by researchers, where it is not the role of the researcher, so 
the argument goes, to step in and fight on behalf of others. Such intervention would fail anyway, 
since power is too distributed and localised for global critique and denunciation to succeed in 
disturbing its operations.6  
Extending these ideas to the ´end of educationµ it becomes apparent that, from the above 
view of genealogical analysis, this end is a non-issue; it is a global abstraction. Genealogy does not 
operate at this level. It does not engage with grandiose problems. From this point of view, the end 
of education is a diversion that serious analysts occupying themselves with the everyday nature of 
power do well to avoid. The end of education is a distracting idea that prevents the post-
Foucauldian analyst from examining the multifaceted nature of educational experience. Such 
problems impede analysis by reducing investigation to a single imperative.  
Whilst I am sympathetic to many of the genealogical insights that are transmitted through this 
received view, it risks becoming institutionalised in such a way that ignores other salient features of 
                                                          
6 For reasons of space, I only offer here a brief characterization of this dominant interpretation and 
enaFWPHQWRI)RXFDXOW·VZRUN)RUDPRUHGHWDLOHGFULWLTXHVHH$OOHQDQG*RGGDUG. 
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genealogical intervention. As I have argued elsewhere in collaboration with Roy Goddard, 
)RXFDXOW·V GHtermination to localize and particularize problems, and his overall avoidance of 
political position-taking, has been translated by key figures in the field into a self-imposed ethic of 
analytic caution, a form of reserve amounting to political quietism, a position that associates all 
bolder forms of critique with the kind of intellectual closed-mindedness that Foucault was careful 
to avoid (Allen & Goddard, 2014). This is based on a reading of Foucault that marginalises the role 
and significance of his ´hyper- and pessimistic activismµ (Foucault, 1983/2000b, p. 256), where 
Foucault was himself able to switch between cautious analysis and moments of direct action (see, 
for example, Macey, 1993, pp. 205, 226, 270, 312, 341²352). Though Nietzsche was hardly a 
political figure in this sense, his writing did not lack boldness or shy away from confrontation. In 
the persistence and vehemence of his attacks, one encounters the obsessional, slightly deranged, 
PXOWLIDFHWHG IRUFH RI 1LHW]VFKH·V ZRUN VHH .ORVVRZVNL, 1969/2000, for an early and influential 
commentary here). This speaks for genealogy as it refuses rest, security and the comfort of calmer 
modes of investigation. The tone of genealogy appears decidedly out of kilter when compared to 
the self-contained poise of the analyst, which Nietzsche might argue is nothing but a deceptive act, 
a pretence. Genealogy attacks its object on multiple (sometimes contradictory) fronts. Indeed, as its 
arguments multiply, objects of analysis change form. Enemies in some contexts become allies in 
others. And so, whilst Nietzsche developed genealogical critique as a means to broach, for example, 
the disturbing idea that Christian morality might one day be extinguished, this was accompanied by 
a fragmentary, impassioned mode of analysis that did not suffer the kind of closure that post-
Foucauldian analysts seem to fear. In a similar way, Foucault undermined the pretentions of the 
Cartesian subject from multiple angles, through work that was diligently scholarly and impassioned. 
The two do not have to be mutually exclusive. 
Prompted by the above arguments, a genealogy of education might concentrate more firmly, 
insistently and obsessively on the problem of education. A more radically configured genealogy of 
education repeatedly questions the necessity of education³a perfectly genealogical, perfectly 
scandalous question. It renders doubtful our commitment to the idea that education at its best or 
most true is necessarily good and beneficent. In doing so, it may still adopt the kind of indirect, 
piecemeal, localised approach characteristic of most post-Foucauldian genealogies. It will not 
attempt to depose or dispose of education directly, once and for all. A genealogy of this sort does 
not approach the problem of education as if this thing we call education were reducible to some 
intrinsic educational ideal or truth that could be exposed, challenged and undermined. From a 
genealogical perspective, the very notion that education could be refuted or undermined (or 
supported) by reasonable argument makes little sense. Genealogy argues but at the same time 
undermines the grounds of debate, carrying out its critique within the normative structures it 
attacks. It works within these normative frameworks, rendering them unstable and liable to collapse 
in their own terms. Since these frameworks are distributed across space and throughout history, 
they cannot be undermined at all points and in all respects. They are beyond the reach of complete 
understanding and synoptic critique, and can only ever be gestured at. Hence, genealogy uses 
exaggeration and hyperbole just as much as it anatomizes (Saar, 2008). It deploys its analysis within 
a stylistic framework that is affective and compelling, not simply convincing (Rayner, 2003). In 
arranging its attacks, genealogy does not attempt to cut to the core of an issue or grasp it in its 
essence in order to refute or overcome it. It confronts our commitment to education by more 
insidious means, undermining that commitment from within.  
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Towards a Genealogy of Education 
 
The genealogy I have in mind offers its own history of our commitment to the idea of education. In 
so doing, it destabilises the very notion that education is something about which a distinct history 
could be organised, diversifying our understanding of what education has entailed throughout 
history to such an extent that education can no longer function so easily as a historical signifier or 
principle of continuity through change. Though the word ´educationµ does not fall out of use, it is 
shorn of its dignity, the presumption that educational activities have some kind of intrinsic 
consistency and value that allows them to be identified as such across histories and cultures. Given 
this situation, a predicament where education signifies everything and nothing, the genealogist can 
only ever take up a position in relation to education that is inescapably, self-consciously ironic.  
 
The (Self-)Destruction of a Field of Study 
 
It might seem trifling to point out that, ancillary to this destruction of our faith in education, a 
field of study must also confront the idea of its end. A genealogy of education makes educational 
studies, sometimes known as educational research, appear redundant. It no longer makes sense 
according to this point of view to speak of educational psychology, the history of education, the 
philosophy of education, or the sociology of education (as the field was traditionally divided). 
Admittedly, these sub-disciplines have been disintegrating of their own accord for some time now, 
at least in the UK, or in the case of educational psychology, have become detached from 
educational studies, focusing on educational concerns only insofar as they raise psychological 
questions or professional issues for the educational psychologist (see Lawn and Furlong, 2009; 
Burton & Bartlett, 2006; McCulloch, 2002; Crook, 2002). The old disciplinary arrangements are no 
longer seen to be foundational, or necessary, with the study of education divided by theme (i.e., 
educational management and administration, disability and inclusion) or phase (i.e., early childhood 
education, childhood and youth studies, higher education). This new settlement is welcomed by 
some, who either believe that it affords new opportunities for dialogue between disciplines in a field 
too complex and far-reaching to be restrained within such boundaries (see Pirrie & Gillies, 2012; 
Hofstetter, 2012; Palaiologou, 2010), or that it allows education to develop as a discipline in its own 
right, no longer dependent on the sanctioning of the ´parentµ disciplines (see Biesta, 2011; Tubbs 
& Grimes, 2001). Whilst the former position assumes that education is still worthy as a point about 
which (trans)disciplinary endeavour is organised, the latter position shifts education to its adjectival 
form, variously understood as a means to enlightenment and Bildung, a route to becoming human 
and achieving autonomy. Those defending educational studies from this latter position come to 
depend on their insistence that the study of education can resource itself, build itself from itself, 
based on its ability as an educational endeavour to identify and evaluate activities as distinctly 
educational. The study of education comes to rely on the assumed presence, distinct consistency 
and inherent respectability of these educational commitments.  
In sum, all of these positions remain founded on their implicit faith in the beneficence of 
education and its unassailably objective existence. What has changed, however, is that it seems even 
less likely now that those working in education departments will pose themselves the question, 
´What is the study of education a study of?µ Due to the disintegration of the old disciplines (at least three 
of which adopted the formula ´; of educationµ in their titles), there is even less incentive to 
confront the problem of what it means to be of education, and hence, of what education is, of what 
these disciplines are engaging in the study of, all questions that must entertain doubt if they are to 
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be truly asked. The problem of an underpinning commitment to education is left largely 
unaddressed in the very places where it might be most diligently troubled.7 It is indeed possible to 
work in such departments and give all the outward signs of indifference to the question of 
education. Crucially, however, this growing indifference, this disinclination to interrogate the 
meaning of education, is not the same as expressing indifference to the value of education, merely to 
its questioning as an idea. In these departments as elsewhere, faith in education persists. This faith 
is what a genealogy of education unpicks. A genealogy of education reveals that even in such 
environments, even in places where the question of education is no longer posed, a basic 
attachment to education remains to be confronted. 
 
The (Self-)Destruction of Educational Passion 
 
A genealogy of education begins by confronting the cynical and pragmatic accommodations 
that serve to conceal and thereby protect our more basic attachment to a project of educational 
redemption. It sets out by invoking a passion for education, so to speak, drawing out a commitment 
to education, a commitment to some implicitly unifying and culturally pre-eminent notion of 
education that gives educational work its moral seriousness. This implicit, submerged attachment to 
the idea of education that may still be found in education departments and in educational 
institutions more broadly is paraded as a necessary prelude/rehearsal before educators and educated 
people experience its disintegration. A genealogy of education undermines our belief in education, 
in part by drawing it from the shadows, bringing its historical formulation, its discursive structuring 
to full expression, showing how our faith must collapse with the failure of education as an 
organising idea. Those who study education, and those who work in the shadow of the idea that 
education is worth studying, are faced with the realisation that they organise themselves about an 
imaginary point. The object of study that we call education can no longer be maintained so easily as 
their implicit rationale. There would no longer be a secure point or central axis about which 
historical, philosophical, sociological, psychological or any other kind of disciplinary reflection 
could be organised, or to which everything that goes on under these banners and the more general 
banner of educational research could be at least notionally attached. If a genealogy of education was 
attempted, its findings understood, and its implications seriously attended to, these areas of study 
would discover why they could never succeed in attaining their object, and so were always doomed 
to incoherence. 
It would no longer even make sense to speak of the end of education as if the idea of education 
could culminate and terminate at some final, abysmal moment. As a single, monumental event, the 
end of education would be revealed as just another phantom or effect of the idea of education. 
Here, in drawing attention to the insubstantiality of the idea of education, other, more recent 
                                                          
7 Within the broad field of educational studies, there are notable exceptions, including work cited in this 
paper (by Clarke, Bojesen, Peim, Moran and Kendall). Nonetheless, such work can at times struggle to 
negotiate its own commitment to education, often reasserting the importance of education, and doing so 
sometimes despite itself. In a similar way, and to offer another example, recent work drawing attention to the 
inherent negativity of educational experience, noting the place of despair, suffering, doubt and pain (Roberts, 
2016), does so in order to reassert the importance of education for helping us negotiate these experiences. 
The possibility that education by its very operation produces despair and its own kind of anguish remains off the 
agenda. Coming from a very different direction, a recently published collection arguing ´against valueµ in 
education³that is to say, against the felt need to defend the value of education for the benefit of its auditors 
(Ladkin, McKay, & Bojesen, 2016)³only reasserts its commitment to the importance of education in making 
its argument ´against value.µ The mode of that commitment is heterodox, but it is a commitment to 
education nonetheless. 
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thinkers haYHSURYHGXVHIXO)ROORZLQJWKHH[DPSOHRI5RODQG%DUWKHV·Mythologies, education has 
been presented as the ´master myth of our timeµ³its promise of social salvation bearing little 
relation to its reality (Peim, 2013, p. 32). In a similar direction, Jean BDXGULOODUG·VZRUNKDVEHHQ
used to draw attention to the ´ontological fetishismµ of those who believe in education and ´insist 
on a reality behind the signµ (Moran & Kendall, 2009, p. 334). There is ´no real education, no real 
of educationµ Moran and Kendall argue, only ´a series of forgeries; an endless number of 
simulationsµ (p. 327). Real education is a metaphysical spectre, a simulation, produced in part by the 
activities of educational researchers and critics who continue to insist on the reality of the thing 
they claim to investigate. Those hoping to evade its grasp must attempt to ´step away from the 
omnipresenceµ of this simulation ´for long enough to acquire a critical displacement, sufficient to 
take stock of the myth of educationµ in all its fragmented, elusive and hence near-unassailable 
supremacy (p. 334).  
Another way of framing this problem, drawing now from Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, 
would be to understand education as a ´fantasmatic narrativeµ (Clarke, 2012, p. 179) that maintains 
our commitment to it beyond all rational argument. In our attachment to education, Matthew 
Clarke argues, there is an element of fantasy operating, motivating and horrifying us in equal 
measure. We find ourselves switching between (a) a ´beatific formµ of the narrative, ´involving 
promises of harmony and fullness once the obstacle to our full enjoyment [the current imperfection 
of education] is overcomeµ and (b) a ´horrific form, in which the obstacle to our full enjoyment 
[anything that hinders real education] proves insurmountableµ (p. 179). The beatific narrative 
´offers promise of social salvation [via education] in the form of complete social harmony or 
efficiencyµ whilst the horrific narrative threatens us with spectres of ´inexorable societal declineµ 
(S:HPLJKWUHDG3RVWPDQ·VSRVLWLRQWKURXJKWKLVIDQWDVPDWLFORJLF 
Nonetheless, from a genealogical perspective, the affective grip of education extends beyond its 
mythological, simulated, or fantasmatic presence. It is located just as much in the mundane 
everyday practices, in the habitual behaviours and banal protocols that form our educational 
experience and constitute us as functional, functioning educated beings. Emile Bojesen (2016) 
suggests that contemporary education is constituted just as much by its repeatable physical gestures 
as it is by metaphysical notions. It is made up of habits and everyday procedures that operate 
without much reference to a cogent metaphysical rationale, educational or otherwise. There is, 
indeed, some pleasure to be gained from the rather pointless practices education has us enact³all 
of which must be admitted if these educational habits are to be confronted. And yet, despite its 
emphasis on the banal practices of everyday life (and the necessity of disrupting them), the 
genealogical perspective concurs with the positions outlined above (by Peim, Moran, Kendall and 
Clarke). Education must also still be attacked as a master-narrative, and here it cannot be disturbed 
by reason alone. Hence, the genealogist seeks to cultivate, and should expect to encounter, a degree 
of shock and consternation as the myth, simulated presence, or fantasmatic logic of education is 
perturbed. Genealogy operates by affective means as much as it does by rational argument, where 
the reactions it provokes are the product of myth, simulation or fantasmatic narrative under strain. 
Most commonly, however, it will encounter a refusal to engage, a resolute and quiet dismissal 
issuing from those who still believe that education exists as something of singular (divine) 
importance that we might be deprived of.  
The genealogist does not welcome the affective states genealogy provokes as if their very 
manifestation were a sign of victory, nor pretend we can escape the grasp of education simply by 
drawing attention to its mythological, fantasmatic or simulated presence, or by refusing its everyday 
habits. In a move that may well invite bewilderment, the genealogist attempts to escape, or at least 
loosen the grasp of education by educational means. And so, whilst a genealogy of education seeks 
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to disturb our infatuation with the idea of education by revealing its growing dispersal across sites 
and practices that share nothing but the common illusion that they are united by their ´educationalµ 
intent (and so shares much with the arguments presented above), the genealogist remains attached 
to education, working within a discursive realm that is brought (and bringing itself) to ruin. Like 
Nietzsche, the genealogist ´is painfully aware that he [or she] is a creature of the crisis rather than 
its resolutionµ Indeed, it has been suggested that it is precisely this awareness that ´lends a strained 
sometimes fractured quality to his argument [in On the Genealogy of Morals]µ where ´the complexities 
arising from Nietzsche·s implication in his own problem are all too easy to underestimateµ (Ridley, 
1998, p. 12). The genealogist is symptomatic of the ruin of education; a wretched figure, both of 
and against education. The genealogist is an exemplary though undeniably odd manifestation of its 
distended, unbearably strained predicament. 
 
Working Within a Discursive Realm Brought to Ruin 
 
It should be clear by now that a genealogy of education undermines the ground upon which it 
sits. As it proceeds, genealogical analysis discovers that education can only be encountered (if at all) 
by tracing the descent of a motley array of sentiments, articles of faith, and systems of conscience 
loosely associated with the idea of education. A genealogy of this sort discovers that it must always 
encounter anything but education. Tracing the descent of associated ideas and practices that 
surround but never give substance to the idea of education, genealogy is ´sensitive to their 
recurrenceµ as Foucault writes, ´not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution but to 
isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different rolesµ (1971/2000a, p. 369). Resisting 
the word ´educationµ as if that word had kept its meaning throughout time, genealogy gradually 
undermines our use of the wRUGLQDQ\FRQWH[W5HMHFWLQJLQ)RXFDXOW·VWHUPV´the metahistorical 
deployment of ideal significationsµ (p 370)³of ideas such as education³genealogy sets out to 
reveal their inherent instability, their tendency to shift and adjust, deceive, disappoint, and co-opt. 
But a genealogy of this kind also remains obsessed by education since it is not possible to step 
outside the master-narrative of education by power of will alone. 
A genealogy of education of the sort envisaged here outsteps all educational genealogies 
hitherto attempted. But it borrows from them too, and so remains in tension with the kinds of 
post-Foucauldian scholarship outlined above, with their commitment to a cautious, modest 
erudition, from which any statements of position or political commitments that exceed their 
expressions of determined humility are treated as symptomatic of intellectual simple-mindedness. 
This, precisely, is what a genealogy of education must risk. In their commitment to the study of 
education, to the idea that education is worthy of, actually demands, study, prior genealogies 
function as unwitting echoes of precisely the educated stance a more radically configured genealogy 
of education will undermine. To continue the argument made earlier in this paper, post-
Foucauldian analysis (particularly ´JRYHUQPHQWDOLW\µ LQVSLUHG ZRUN ZKLFK UHDFKHV EDFN WR The 
Foucault Effect; see Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991) has been unduly hobbled by its scrupulous 
´microphysicalµ descriptions of power, which rule out any form of speculative thought that exceeds 
the protocols of its analysis. In its diligence, it has largely avoided engagement with the performed, 
immanent and uncomfortable critique of the genealogist. But again, this kind of discomfort is 
precisely what a genealogy of education must risk. Nonetheless, and despite its suspicion of the 
study of education, a genealogy of education³of the more radically configured Nietzschean sort³
does not step outside education or scholarship, placing itself in direct opposition. Not only is this 
positioning outside education impossible, but any attempt to achieve an exterior point of view 
would regenerate the idealised conception of education genealogy seeks to make questionable. The 
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genealogist is neither anti-intellectual, nor anti-education for that reason, though the genealogist is 
never entirely at home in intellectual and educated circles either. Drawing inspiration from ancient 
Cynic philosophy, which both Foucault (2011) and Nietzsche (Bracht Branham, 2004) invoke in 
their work, it would be better to describe the genealogist as an intellectual, educational irritant.  
Dismantling our commitment to education, a genealogy of education remains invested in, and 
perhaps infected by, its educational zeitgeist. Genealogy is insurgent in that sense. Tediously, 
relentlessly educational, a genealogy of this sort has no option but to work with the very materials 
of education and educated thought, which already contain within themselves the workings of their 
destruction. As such, the genealogist is sWLOO FORVHU WR1LHW]VFKH·V ´last manµ³the exhausted and 
barren end point of Western civilization³than his triumphant Übermensch (1883²1891/2008). 
If a genealogy of education does not escape what it anatomises, and must accompany education 
in its decline, this reflects in part the genealogical determination to avoid claims to some kind of 
transcendence, ´apocalyptic objectivityµ or view from above (Foucault, 1971/2000a, p. 379). It also 
UHIOHFWV WKH JHQHDORJLVW·V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI KLVWRULFDO FKDQJH ZKLFK RFcurs only through the 
´dissention of other thingsµ³and as such, often depends on the ´derisive and ironicµ reversal or 
inversion of preceding forms (p. 372; see also, Nietzsche, 1887/1998, II§12). Education today is 
largely composed of such accumulated material, a motley array of educational assumptions, 
affective states and technologies. These materials are all piled upon one another, just as, according 
to Nietzsche, each historically successive interpretation of Christian doctrine piled another layer of 
meaning on preceding habits and religious ways of life (Geuss, 1994). This complex of techniques 
and ideas we call ´educationµ is the historical aggregate of preceding modes of educational activity 
that have been repeatedly modified and invested with new meaning for the duration of their 
descent.  
These educational techniques and dispositions find themselves thrust alongside one another 
DQG JLYHQ IXQFWLRQDO IRUP LQ WKH XQKDSS\ RYHUFRPPLWWHG SHUVRQDJH RI WRGD\·V HGXFDWRU 7KH
strange assemblage that forms the contemporary educator is, indeed, key to understanding how 
such diverse, warped and seemingly contradictory educational traditions are made to work. Of 
course, genealogy specialises in character studies (Ridley, 1998)³some might say character 
assassination³DQGLVVXLWHGWRWKLVPRGHRIDQDO\VLV:HPD\ORRNQRIXUWKHUWKDQ1LHW]VFKH·VOn 
the Genealogy of Morals for a conceptual frame by which we could begin to understand the subjectivity 
of the educator. One could indeed argue that the educator inherits character traits and dispositions 
from the six main personality types outlined in that text. The educator is at times slave, priest and 
scientist, and may even display traits derived from the noble, philosopher and artist (see Ridley, 
1998, for a close analysis of these personality types). Suffering these conflicting evaluative positions, 
the educator has no natural home and is forced to shift from one to another in search of a 
grounding and security that remains forever elusive. 
Education can be understood, then, as a rather disordered but nonetheless operationally 
functional cultural and technical conglomerate. It is the accumulated effect of attempts to secure 
the dominion of cultures that have come and gone. A genealogy of education represents the 
culmination and fruit of this process. It lays bare that piled-up assemblage of battered, repurposed 
and reinvested educational techniques and demonstrates how they are held together in the 
contorted being of the educator. Genealogy observes this accumulated disorder of ideals and 
intentions from below, offering itself as an illuminating spectacle; appearing as a ´parodic and 
farcicalµ extension of the educational masquerade it sets out to attack (Foucault, 1971/2000a, p. 
385). In so doing, it seeks to ´push that masquerade to its limitµ (p. 386), accepting the fragmented 
history of Western education as its own inheritance, picking up the various masks that we use to 
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justify educated being, and parading them about in all their incoherence.8  
It is well known or at least well documented that Western education suffers from its conflicting 
and fragmented aims. It lacks the synthesis that a clear vision of the moral purpose of education 
might offer. As Alasdair MacIntyre puts it, when debating the present purpose and future of 
education, we scarcely have ´enough agreement to be able to arrive at a common mind about what 
it is that we should be quarrelling aboutµ (1987, p. 28). This is the basis of his accompanying claim 
that the teaching profession has come to represent the ´forlorn hope of the culture of Western 
modernityµ (p. 16). All of which can be admitted, and still we do not approach the position adopted 
by the genealogist, who does not lament the conflicted state of education as MacIntyre might, and 
finds his depiction in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990) decidedly irksome. Despite 
0DF,QW\UH·V FODLP WR KDYH EHFRPH ´a native speakerµ in the genealogical tradition (p. 114),9 the 
genealogist senses that, although MacIntyre engages with genealogy better than most, he 
nonetheless arrives with colonial intent.  
The genealogist does not heed arguments to the effect that we should construct new ´forms of 
community within which civility and the intellectual and moral lifeµ of educated people ´can be 
sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon usµ (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 263). Though 
MacIntyre is famous for his pessimism, the genealogist finds that he is not nearly pessimistic 
enough. Do conceptions of the moral worth and unifying effects of the ´educated mindµ get any 
PRUH RYHUW VXSSRUW WKDQ LQ 0DF,QW\UH·V ZULWLQJ" 0DF,QW\UH DUJXHV IRU WKH FXOWLYDWLRQ RI DQ
educated disposition (currently lacking at all levels) that is just as ´crucial for plain personsµ (2009, 
p. 360), he tells us, as it is for those in SRVLWLRQVRISRZHU,Q0DF,QW\UH·VDVVHVVPHQWWKRVHODFNLQJ
such a disposition (and this represents nearly all of us) are not only unable to participate in the 
´higherµ realms of culture, but are also, more generally speaking, ´defective practical reasonersµ (p. 
359). With MacIntyre, we return most explicitly to the formula that underpins educational thought: 
education is both the source of the problem and its own solution. He concludes with the grandiose 
claim that ´a surprising number of the major disordersµ of recent decades ´have been brought 
about by some of the most distinguished graduates of some of the most distinguished universitiesµ 
and are, as a result, ´the result of an inadequate general educationµ³as if a better version of 
education could have prevented such disasters as ´the Vietnam War, the policies of the United 
States towards Iran for more than half a century, and the present world economic crisisµ (p. 361). 
Switching to the generally more moderate, or perhaps cloaked perspective of critics working 
within education departments, the genealogist again fails to heed those who would still seek to 
defend the teaching profession as a whole against disintegration, as if, with sufficient critical effort, 
the conflicting aims and purposes of education might be someday reconciled. Rather, the 
genealogist pursues the fragmentation of education and does so with mixed feelings, including some 
measure of malicious delight.  
 
 
                                                          
8 Arguably, this is what was attempted by the second century satirist Lucian (see Branham, 1989), an author 
IURPZKRP1LHW]VFKHGUHZFRQVLGHUDEOH LQVSLUDWLRQDQGWKURXJKZKRPZHPLJKWXQGHUVWDQG1LHW]VFKH·V
Übermensch as a parody of self-transcenGHQFH VHH %DELFK  /XFLDQ·V REMHFWLYHV ZHUH OLNHO\ PRUH
FRQVHUYDWLYH WKDQ 1LHW]VFKH·V DGRSWLQJ PXOWLSOH PDVNV SOD\LQJ RQH +HOOHQLF FKDUDFWHU RII DQRWKHU LQ D
dizzying parody of forms that nonetheless asserted the value of a common, high-brow intellectual tradition 
VHH%UDQKDPS,QRWKHUZRUGV/XFLDQ·VVDWLUHZDV ´trimmed to the irony of those in powerµ 
(Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 174). 
9 Or, as MacIntyre puts it earlier in the book, one can ´learn the idiom of each [the 19th century 
encyclopaedist and genealogist] from within as a new first language, much in the way that an anthropologist 
constitutes him or herself a linguistic and cultural beginner in some alien cultureµ (p. 43).  
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The Body of the Educated 
 
The body becomes the principal site of analysis, viewed as the key operator and source of 
caprice within the system. Drawing from Nietzsche, a genealogy of education begins and remains 
with the body. It explores how the body, in all its weakness and failure to endure, became the 
rationale and point of flight for the ´contemplative life.µ To deliver themselves to the 
contemplative life, those hoping to be educated turned to what Adriana Cavarero called the 
philosophy of the ´birth-giving maleµ (1995, p. 92). In so doing, they did not exclude the body 
from their operations. The body was trained and ordered by the spiritual practices of ancient 
philosophy, Roman antiquity and aesthetic Christianity, producing the thinker, prophet and priest 
of Greek and late antiquity, as well as a model of intellectual seriousness and moral virtuosity to 
which we remain indebted (see Hadot, 1995/2004; Brown, 1992, 1988/2008; Foucault, 2005, 2014). 
For the genealogist, the body was never entirely superseded, nor was it completely domesticated by 
these inheritances, and it still bears traces of its denial. Despite all effort to transcend the body and 
locate educated discourse in a more respectable higher realm, for Nietzsche (and so too for 
Foucault) the body remained a key operator via its warped appetites, channelled desires, hidden 
discharges and acquired habits.  
Trained and part domesticated, the body is still firmly in place as ´the sanction of every truth or 
errorµ as Foucault put it (1971/2000a, p. 375). Educated people remain trapped within the 
descendent bodily functions of their great intellectual inheritance. This integrated body forms the 
basis of the Western educational tradition; it defines the bearing of educated people. For Nietzsche, 
one particularly notable example of the contorted and abused educational body belongs of course 
to the scholar who suffers ´cramped intestinesµ from too much time bent over books and print 
(1887/1974, §366). Stiff limbed, this character goes about with ´the awkward embarrassment or 
strutting gateµ of someone who remains bogged down, suffering the long after-effects of 
enmirement in study (1873²1876/1997, p. 134). As Nietzsche makes plain, scholarship offers no 
escape from the materiality of the body; WKHVFKRODU·VDFWLYLW\ LV MXVWDQRWKHUZD\RIFRQWRUWLQJLW
Though his portrait of the scholar is dated10³offering a Gutenberg-age vision of intellectual life³
it still serves its function, drawing attention to the physiognomy of educated people, where those 
who aspire to some version of the contemplative life, those who attempt to conjure some kind of 
rich interiority, will contort themselves and force themselves upright, uptight, according to the 
demands of educated intercourse. Following this line of thought, a genealogy of education insists 
that we attend to the continued presence of the ´educatedµ body and its ongoing manipulation. 
This kind of attention does not imply a celebration of bodily materiality, as if the body could at last 
be released from centuries of repression. Rather, a genealogy of education points to the decidedly 
ugly, convoluted features of civilized bearing³as it ties itself in knots³and explores why those 
contorted attitudes are so very difficult to escape.  
Some of this may sound familiar. For a few years now, academics have been focusing on bodily 
materiality, seeking to address a denial of the body in Western intellectual discourse, and emphasise 
instead the continued role of embodied experience and material artefacts in the operations of 
thought and everyday life. But a genealogy of education of the kind envisaged here will again 
outstep its apparent associates³this time scholars of bodily materiality³observing that this 
                                                          
10 As Peter Roberts puts it, the figure of the bookish, book-bound scholar ´now stands as an almost forgotten 
ideal to which many academics would adhere³if only they had the timeµ (2001, p. 134). Or the space to store 
the requisite books, I should add, given the tendency in some UK universities to move to open-plan offices; a 
VZLWFKWKDWLVDFFRPSDQLHGE\WKHGHSLFWLRQRIWKHDFDGHPLFSUHIHUHQFHIRU´FHOOXODUµRIILFHVDVDUFKDLFDQG
insular.  
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emphasis on the body has only managed to feed new waves of research endeavour, or ´book-
scribblingµ as Nietzsche (1910/2016, p. 81) might put it. Research that attempts to divert attention 
to the embodied dimension of social life continues to operate according to the norms of academic 
enquiry. It upholds and perpetuates the contorted being of the analyst. In a similar way, although 
some critics may now claim to pursue the apparently anti-educational idea of failure, attacking 
mastery and success in education for their patriarchal undertones (Halberstam, 2011), a genealogy 
of education makes the point that academic arguments for failure are still delivered and received 
according to the rubrics of academic success. A genealogy of education risks undermining the 
comfort of each position and lays itself open to ridicule by attacking the subject positions of the 
educated person, the educator and the successful academic, who remain safely within the 
boundaries of educated being even when claiming to exceed or trouble its confines. Almost by 
default, academic debate will reject a genealogy of education configured in this way, and refuse its 
attempts to undermine the status of educated people. Such educated intercourse will, most likely, 
continue to proliferate without too much embarrassment. More debate is always the solution it 
offers, its only solution to itself, as it remains assured of its intrinsic value and importance. 
Reducing our expectations somewhat then, the best one might expect of academic discourse is that 
it acknowledges the extent to which it must domesticate Nietzsche by putting him to use within the 
frameworks of educational critique. It must reconcile itself to the uncomfortable realisation that 
every output of Nietzschean scholarship would, if placed before its originating thinker, ´have 
HDUQHG1LHW]VFKH·VXQG\LQJFRQWHPSWµ (Ridley, 1998, p. 14).  
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